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Abstract
Popper conceived an experiment whose analysis led to a result that he deemed
absurd. Popper wrote that his reasoning was based on the Copenhagen inter-
pretation and therefore invalidated the latter. Actually, Popper’s argument
involves counterfactual reasoning and violates Bohr’s complementarity princi-
ple. The absurdity of Popper’s result only confirms Bohr’s approach.
I called thee to curse mine enemies,
and, behold, thou hast altogether
blessed them.
Numbers 24:10
The emergence of quantum mechanics led to considerable progress in our understanding
of physical phenomena. However, it also led to serious misconceptions. In my current work
as a theoretical physicist, I recently examined a conceptual experiment that was proposed
some time ago by Karl Popper (1982). Its feasibility was challenged by Collett and Loudon
(1987) who claimed that such an experiment would be inconclusive. Nevertheless, an
actual experiment is currently under way (Kim and Shih, 1999). The rigorous theoretical
analysis of these experiments is quite intricate and I shall only briefly outline it here. Most
of the present article is an attempt to analyze the meaning of what Popper wrote and
to understand his way of reasoning. I found it most surprising when I read the original
argument in his book.
Popper’s experiment is a variant of the one considered long ago by Einstein, Podolsky,
and Rosen (1935): a source S emits pairs of particles having a broad angular distribution
but precisely opposite momenta,
p1 + p2 = 0. (1)
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The example given by Popper is that of pairs of photons emitted by the decay of positron-
ium at rest. Actually, the wavelength of gamma rays emitted by positronium is much too
short for realizing Popper’s experiment, but pairs of photons resulting from parametric
down-conversion in a nonlinear crystal (Kim and Shih, 1999) are suitable for that purpose:
these photons have precisely correlated (though not opposite) momenta, and this is all we
need. If we wish, we can refer our calculations to a Lorentz frame moving with a constant
velocity c (p1 + p2)/(E1 + E2), so that Eq. (1) holds in that frame.
Note that Eq. (1) seems to conflict with the quantum “uncertainty principle.” Popper
writes “we consider pairs of particles that move in opposite directions along the positive
and negative x-axis.” If these were classical particles, opposite momenta would indeed
lead to opposite positions. However, the quantum dynamical variables in Eq. (1) do not
commute with (q1+q2). For the components along any axis, we have uncertainty relations
∆(p1 + p2) ∆(q1 + q2) ≥ h¯, (2)
which set a limit on how precisely opposite the positions of the particles will be observed.
This issue was analyzed by Collett and Loudon (1987) who came to the conclusion that
Popper’s experiment (described below) could not give conclusive results. This is just
one example of how hazardous it is to use classical reasoning when we discuss quantum
phenomena. I shall return to this point later.
However, it is no less hazardous to make heuristic use of the “uncertainty principle” in
order to draw quantitative conclusions. What must be done in case of doubt is to write
the Schro¨dinger equation that describes the physical situation, and to derive rigorously
unambiguous results. As will be shown below, the analysis of Popper’s experiment is
much subtler than either Popper, or Collett and Loudon, were inclined to think.
Popper’s proposed experiment proceeds as follows: two observers, whom I shall call
Alice and Bob in accordance with current practice in quantum information theory, are
located on opposite sides of the source, with arrays of detectors as shown in Figure 1.
Alice can place an opaque screen with a narrow slit of width a in the way of her photons,
so that those passing through the slit are diffracted by an angle of the order of λ/a, where
λ is the wavelength of the photons. The narrower the slit, the wider is the scattering
angle.
On this point, Popper writes that “the wider scattering angles go with a narrower slit,
according to the Heisenberg relations.” Actually, the diffraction angle λ/a is a well known
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result of classical optics. The wavelength of the photons, which is the quantity that we
can actually measure, is related to their momentum by the relation λ = h/p, which readily
follows from Einstein’s equation for the photoelectric effect, E = hν. The latter predates
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle by more than 20 years. Still before Heisenberg, it was
de Broglie’s bold intuition to extend the relation λ = h/p to massive particles, and in
that case λ is called the de Broglie wavelength. However, the issue is not just one of
misappropriation of credit. Here, Popper wanted to invoke Heisenberg’s “uncertainty”
because he had in mind that the detection of a particle that had passed through Alice’s
slit was a measurement of the y-coordinate of that particle at it passed through the slit,
and therefore also a virtual measurement of the position of the other particle, since the
two had precisely opposite directions. Let us examine Popper’s text:
According to the EPR argument, we have measured qy for both particles
. . . with the precision ∆qy [≡ a] . . . We can now calculate the y-coordinate
of the [other] particle with approximately the same precision . . . We thus
obtain fairly precise ‘knowledge’ about the qy position of this particle—we have
‘measured’ its position indirectly. And since it is, according to the Copenhagen
interpretation, our knowledge which is described by the theory . . . we should
expect that the momentum of the [second] beam scatters as much as that of
the beam that passes through the slit . . .
To sum up: if the Copenhagen interpretation is correct, then any increase of
our mere knowledge of the position . . . of the particles . . . should increase
their scatter . . .
The italics that appear in the above excerpt are those in the book. Popper refrains from
openly saying that the above prediction is absurd (as it obviously is). He only says that
he is “inclined to predict” that the test will decide against the Copenhagen interpretation.
On this, I have several comments.
First, is not at all clear why Popper associates this absurd prediction (particle scatter
due to potential knowledge by an observer) with the Copenhagen interpretation. This is
another example of credit misappropriation, much worse than having quoted Heisenberg
instead of Einstein or de Broglie. Whatever the “Copenhagen interpretation” is (a point
that I shall discuss later), it is reasonable to expect that it is somehow related to the views
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expressed by Niels Bohr. However, Popper himself wrote explicitly that his proposed
experiment was an extension of the argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935).
It is well known that their argument was promptly criticized by Bohr (1935). I find it
quite remarkable that an opinion which is diametrically opposite to Bohr’s be called the
“Copenhagen interpretation.”
I also have other, more serious objections to the terminology used in the passage
quoted above. In particular, I take exception to the phrase “we have measured qy” of
some particle. Here however, my criticism is not aimed at Popper because we are all
guilty of occasionally talking like that. This is a misleading language, as explained long
ago by Kemble (1937):
We have no satisfactory reason for ascribing objective existence to physical
quantities as distinguished from the numbers obtained when we make the
measurements which we correlate with them. There is no real reason for sup-
posing that a particle has at every moment a definite, but unknown, position
which may be revealed by a measurement of the right kind, or a definite mo-
mentum which can be revealed by a different measurement. On the contrary,
we get into a maze of contradictions as soon as we inject into quantum me-
chanics such concepts carried over from the language and philosophy of our
ancestors. . . It would be more exact if we spoke of “making measurements”
of this, that, or the other type instead of saying that we measure this, that,
or the other “physical quantity.”
Terms that Popper used, such as “knowledge of the y-coordinate . . . or the qy position
of this particle” are flagrant (and admittedly quite common) abuses of an improper lan-
guage. When we are discussing quantum theory, we should refrain from using classical
terminology—or at least be aware that we do so at our own risk.
In classical mechanics, a particle has (ideally) a precise position and a precise momen-
tum. We can in principle measure them with arbitrary accuracy and thereby determine
their numerical values. In quantum mechanics, a particle also has a precise position and
a precise momentum. However, the latter are mathematically represented by self-adjoint
operators in a Hilbert space, not by ordinary numbers. Their nature is quite different from
that of the classical position and momentum. In the early quantum literature, operators
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were called q-numbers, while plain numbers were c-numbers (Dirac, 1926). Likewise, to
avoid confusion, we should have used in quantum theory names such as q-position and q-
momentum, while the corresponding classical dynamical variables would have been called
c-position and c-momentum. If such a distinction had been made, it would have helped to
prevent much of the present confusion about quantum theory. It is the imperfect trans-
lation from the q-language to the c-language that led to the unfortunate introduction of
the term “uncertainty” in that context.
We may note, incidentally, that the theory of relativity did not cause as much mis-
understanding and controversy as quantum theory, because people were careful to avoid
using the same nomenclature as in nonrelativistic physics. For example, elementary text-
books on relativity theory distinguish “rest mass” from “relativistic mass” (hard core
relativists call them simply “mass” and “energy”).
The criticism above was aimed at the terminology used by Popper in proposing his
experiment. Now, it is time to analyze the substance. First, we have to find out how
precisely the two particles of each pair will be aligned opposite to each other, in spite
of the uncertainty relation in Eq. (2). Note that, contrary to the so-called “uncertainty
principle” which is an ill defined concept and has only a heuristic meaning, Eq. (2) is a
rigorous mathematical consequence of the quantum formalism. It puts a lower bound on
the product of the standard deviations of the results of a large number of measurements
performed on identically prepared systems. Each one of these measurements is assumed
to have perfect accuracy (any experimental inaccuracy would have to be added to the
quantum dispersion). There is no “uncertainty” connotation here, unless this uncertainty
merely refers to future outcomes of potential, perfectly accurate measurements that may
be performed on such systems (Ballentine, 1970).
A long calculation (to be published separately) is needed to estimate how precise is
the angular alignment of two particles emitted with opposite momenta. Actually, what
Eq. (2) says is that if an ensemble of pairs of particles is prepared in such a way that
(p1 + p2) is sharp, then the positions of the points halfway between the particles are very
broadly distributed. It says nothing on the angular alignment of distant particles. On
that issue, a detailed calculation shows that if one particle is found in the direction given
by polar and azimuthal angles θ and φ, then the other will be found very nearly in the
opposite direction, with angles pi− θ and φ± pi, respectively. The allowed deviation from
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perfect alignment is too small to be of any consequence in the present discussion.
It is therefore correct to assume, as Popper did, that if a particle is detected behind
Alice’s slit, and if an identical slit were placed by Bob in a symmetric position, then Bob
would definitely detect the other particle of that pair there. However, this does not mean
that Bob’s knowledge creates a “virtual slit” through which his particles are diffracted by
the same angle λ/a. Bob’s knowledge has no physical consequence because it is manifestly
counterfactual. This can easily be seen by considering other counterfactual experiments.
For example, Bob also knows, after he was informed by Alice of what she found, that if
he had placed a slit of width a/2 at a position whose distance from the source is one half
of the distance of Alice’s slit, then he would have detected his particle within that slit
with certainty. In that case, his “virtual slit” is narrower, and therefore the diffraction
angle is wider by a factor 2. In brief, we can imagine infinitely many such counterfactual
experiments (which are mutually exclusive, of course), and each one of these conceptual
slits leads to a different observable diffraction angle, which is absurd.
There is no doubt that Popper was right when he was “inclined to predict” that the test
would give a negative result. However, Popper concluded that “the test decides against the
Copenhagen interpretation” and this assertion requires further scrutiny. What is, indeed,
the Copenhagen interpretation? There seems to be at least as many different Copenhagen
interpretations as people who use that term, probably there are more. For example, in
two classic articles on the foundations of quantum mechanics, Ballentine (1970) and Stapp
(1972) give diametrically opposite definitions of “Copenhagen.” There is no real conflict
between Ballentine and Stapp on how to understand quantum mechanics, except that one
of them calls Copenhagen interpretation what the other considers as the exact opposite of
the Copenhagen interpretation. I shall now explain my own Copenhagen interpretation.
It relies on articles written by Niels Bohr. Whether or not you agree with Bohr, he is the
definitive authority for deciding what is genuine Copenhagen.
Quantum mechanics provides statistical predictions for the results of measurements
performed on physical systems that have been prepared in specified ways (Peres, 1995).
(I hope that everyone agrees at least with that statement. The only question here is
whether there is more than that to say about quantum mechanics.) The preparation of
quantum systems and their measurement are performed by using laboratory hardware
which is described in classical terms. If you have doubts about that, just have a look at
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any paper on experimental physics. The necessity of using a classical terminology was
emphasized by Bohr (1949) whose insistence on this point was very strict:
However far the [quantum] phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical
explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms.
The argument is simply that by the word ‘experiment’ we refer to a situation
where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learned and
that, therefore, the account of the experimental arrangement and the results
of the observations must be expressed in unambiguous language with suitable
application of the terminology of classical physics.
The keywords in that excerpt are: classical terms . . . unambiguous language . . . termi-
nology of classical physics . Bohr did not say that there are in nature classical systems
and quantum systems. There are physical systems for which we may use a classical de-
scription or a quantum description, according to circumstances, and with various degrees
of approximation. It is according to our assessment of the physical circumstances that
we decide whether the q-language or the c-language is appropriate. Physics is not an
exact science, it is a science of approximations. Unfortunately, Bohr was misunderstood
by some (perhaps most) physicists who were unable to make the distinction between lan-
guage and substance, and he was also misunderstood by philosophers who disliked his
positivism.
It is remarkable that Bohr never considered the measuring process as a dynamical
interaction between an apparatus and the system under observation. Measurement had
to be understood as a primitive notion. Bohr thereby eluded questions which caused
considerable controversy among other authors (Wheeler and Zurek, 1983). Bohr willingly
admitted that any intermediate systems used in the measuring process could be treated
quantum mechanically, but the final instrument always had a purely classical description
(Bohr, 1939):
In the system to which the quantum mechanical formalism is applied, it is of
course possible to include any intermediate auxiliary agency employed in the
measuring process [but] some ultimate measuring instruments must always be
described entirely on classical lines, and consequently kept outside the system
subject to quantum mechanical treatment.
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Yet, a quantum measurement is not a supernatural process. Measuring apparatuses are
made of the same kind of matter as everything else and they obey the same physical laws.
It therefore seems natural to use quantum theory in order to investigate their behavior
during a measurement. This was first attempted by von Neumann (1932) in his treatise
on the mathematical foundations of quantum theory. In the last section of that book, as
in an afterthought, von Neumann represented the apparatus by a single degree of freedom
whose value was correlated to that of the dynamical variable being measured. Such an
apparatus is not, in general, left in a definite pure state, and does not admit a classical
description. Therefore, von Neumann introduced a second apparatus which observes the
first one, and possibly a third apparatus, and so on, until there is a final measurement,
which is not described by quantum dynamics and has a definite result (for which quantum
mechanics can only give statistical predictions). The essential point that was suggested,
but not proved by von Neumann, is that the introduction of this sequence of apparatuses
is irrelevant: the final result is the same, irrespective of the location of the “cut” between
classical and quantum physics. (At this point, von Neumann also speculated that a final
step would involve the consciousness of the observer—a rather bizarre statement in a
mathematically rigorous monograph.)
These different approaches of Bohr and von Neumann were reconciled by Hay and Peres
(1998), who introduced a dual description for the measuring apparatus. It obeys quantum
mechanics while it interacts with the system under observation, and then it is “dequan-
tized” and is described by a classical Liouville density, which provides the probability
distribution for the results of the measurement. Alternatively, the apparatus may always
be treated by quantum mechanics, and be measured by a second apparatus which has
such a dual description. Hay and Peres showed that these two different methods of calcu-
lation give the same result, provided that the measuring apparatus satisfies appropriate
conditions (otherwise, it is not a valid measuring apparatus).
The other fundamental feature of Bohr’s presentation of quantum theory is the principle
of complementarity, which asserts that when some types of predictions are possible, others
are not, because they are related to mutually incompatible experiments. For example,
in the situation described by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935), the choice of the
experiment performed on the first system determines the type of prediction that can be
made for the results of experiments performed on the second system (Bohr, 1935).
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In Popper’s experiment, Bob can predict what would have happened if he had placed
slits of various sizes at various positions, or no slit at all. However, all these possible
setups are mutually incompatible. In particular, if Bob puts no slit at all, the result
he obtains is not the one he would have obtained if he had put a slit. Counterfactual
experiments need not have consistent results (Peres, 1978).
Note that Bohr did not contest the validity of counterfactual reasoning. He wrote
(Bohr, 1935):
Our freedom of handling the measuring instruments is characteristic of the
very idea of experiment . . . we have a completely free choice whether we want
to determine the one or the other of these quantities . . .
Thus, Bohr found it perfectly legitimate to consider counterfactual alternatives: observers
have free will and can arbitrarily choose their experiments. However, each experimental
setup must be considered separately. In particular, no valid conclusion can be drawn
from the comparison of possible results of mutually incompatible experiments. Bohr
was sometimes accused of being elusive, because his approach does not provide answers
to questions in which people may be interested. There are indeed questions that seem
reasonable but do not correspond to any conceivable experiment: quantum theory has no
obligation to answer meaningless questions.
To conclude this article, let me report the result of a rigorous analysis of Popper’s
experimental setup, where only Schro¨dinger’s equation is used, without invoking any
controversial interpretation. The irony of the answer is that Bob does observe a diffraction
broadening, as if he had a virtual slit! However, that slit is not located between him and
the source, but is precisely located where Alice’s real slit is, and is indeed identical to
it. An experiment similar to Popper’s proposal was actually performed by Strekalov
et al. (1995), who used a double slit, so that Bob had a virtual double slit, producing
a neat interference pattern, not only a diffraction broadening. Figure 2 is a simplified
sketch of that experiment. Its complete theoretical analysis involves advanced concepts
of quantum optics and is quite intricate. I shall now give a brief outline of the theory,
based on Schro¨dinger’s equation.
The only “knowledge” needed in the analysis of the experiment is the factual one, on the
preparation and observation procedures. That knowledge is formally encapsulated in the
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Hilbert-space vectors |Ψ0〉 and |Ψd〉, whose coordinate-space representation is localized
in the source of particles and in the detectors that were excited, respectively. (These
vectors are also known as “quantum states.”) Schro¨dinger’s equation asserts that the
initial vector |Ψ0〉 evolves in time, as long as there is no detection event, according to a
unitary transformation
|Ψ0〉 → |Ψt〉 = Ut |Ψ0〉, (3)
where Ut = e
−iHt/h¯ for a time-independent Hamiltonian H . In the present case, the
double slit can be represented by an infinite potential in H , or by an equivalent boundary
condition.
Born’s rule (which makes the connection between the quantum formalism and observed
probabilities of macroscopic events) asserts that the probability that a particular pair of
detectors will “click” at time t is P = |〈Ψd, Ψt〉|
2, where the symbol 〈u, v〉 denotes the
scalar product of two vectors, |u〉 and |v〉. We thus have (Peres, 1995)
P = |〈Ψd, Ut Ψ0〉|
2 ≡ |〈U †t Ψd, Ψ0〉|
2, (4)
where U †t = U−t is the unitary operator for the time-reversed dynamics. It may be
practically impossible to realize experimentally that reversed dynamics, but it is legitimate
to perform the calculation of the ordinary dynamics by proceeding backwards, starting
at the detectors and ending at the source. In the present case, this is indeed much easier,
because |Ψ0〉 is entangled and has to satisfy Eq. (1), while
|Ψd〉 = |ψ1〉 ⊗ |ψ2〉, (5)
is a tensor product of two vectors, whose coordinate-space representations are well sepa-
rated, since they are localized in the two detectors. Moreover, the Hamiltonian is the sum
of those of the two particles, since the latter do not interact after they leave the source.
Therefore the unitary evolution also factorizes: U−t = U1 ⊗ U2. We thus propagate |ψ1〉
and |ψ2〉 from the detectors toward the source. We have to compute
P = |〈Ψ0, (U1ψ1 ⊗ U2ψ2)〉|
2. (6)
Now, since |Ψ0〉 satisfies Eq. (1), the only contribution to P comes from components of
|U1ψ1 ⊗ U2ψ2〉 with opposite momenta that also satisfy Eq. (1). This is illustrated in
10
Figure 2. For example, if we record all the detections on Bob’s side that are in coinci-
dence with one particular detector of Alice, then Bob will observe an ordinary double-slit
interference pattern, generated by a “virtual” double-slit, that actually is Alice’s real slit.
Note that it is necessary, for such an observation to be possible, that the region of the
nonlinear crystal from where the rays emerge be very broad (Hong and Mandel, 1985)
and the emergence point be undetermined. Likewise, if the experiment were done with
positronium as Popper originally suggested, the positronium ought to be prepared with
∆y much larger than the distance between the slits. Expressed in an informal language,
the requirement is that each one of the two photons that pass through both slits must also
originate in both regions of the source. This demand is similar to the conditions required
for the Pfleegor and Mandel (1967) experiment, where a single photon originates from two
different lasers and gives rise to first order interference. A similar analysis also applies
to Popper’s original experiment with a single slit (however, it would be more difficult to
draw for it a figure like Figure 2).
In summary, according to the Copenhagen interpretation, as Bohr apparently under-
stood it, quantum theory is not a description of physical reality. It also does not deal with
anthropomorphic notions such as knowledge or consciousness. All it does is to provide
correct answers to meaningful questions about experiments done with physical systems.
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FIGURE 1. Popper’s conceptual experiment. A pair of photons with opposite momenta
is emitted by the source S. Alice’s detectors are on the left, those of Bob on the right.
FIGURE 2. Simplified sketch of the experiment of Strekalov et al. (1995). The figure
shows a single pair of photons with opposite momenta, emitted by the source S. When
many such pairs are detected in coincidence, interference patterns appear on both sides.
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